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1. Introduction 
It has long been recognized that the efficient function of the public sector is a requisite 
for a country’s economic success. Yet, the measurement of government efficiency and 
the resulting comparison of individual countries’ public sectors present a number of 
difficulties related to the scarcity of publicly available data and the complicated problems 
that may emerge in the estimation procedure. Only recently a small number of studies 
cultivated an effort towards the computation of relative public sector efficiency 
indicators.1 Concerning OECD economies, Afonso et al. (2005) employed a 
nonparametric method to estimate relative efficiency scores for several parts of the public 
sector in 23 OECD countries during the 1980s and the 1990s.2  Using similar techniques, 
Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005) estimated the efficiency of government spending on 
education and health using a sample of 30 OECD countries. 
The basic shortcoming of the simple nonparametric approaches to efficiency 
measurement has been their inability to distinguish the inefficiency attributable to bad 
governmental managerial practices from the inefficiency arising from differences in 
socioeconomic environments or factors attributable to mere luck.3 In light of this 
shortcoming, some recent studies involved two- and three-stage analyses that purge the 
                                                 
1 There is an abundant literature measuring the productive efficiency of various types of decision making 
units at the micro level, using either parametric or nonparametric techniques (which are discussed in some 
detail in the following section). For an introduction to the parametric methods see Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000) and for the nonparametric methods see Charnes et al. (2004). However, only a few papers used 
these techniques (primarily the nonparametric ones) on cross-country data to measure public sector 
efficiency. Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) assessed the efficiency of government spending on education and 
health for 37 African countries, while Herrera and Pang (2005) estimated several health and education 
efficiency indicators for a sample of 140 countries from 1996 to 2002. Sijpe and Rayp (2007) estimated 
government inefficiency for 52 developing countries over the 1990’s. Afonso et al. (2006) estimated the 
public sector efficiency of the new EU member states and emerging economies. Using a parametric 
methodology, Angelopoulos et al. (2007) obtained relative public sector efficiency scores for a world 
sample of 64 countries over the period 1980-2000.   
2 More precisely Afonso et al. (2005) estimate 4 public sector “opportunity” indicators that take into 
account administrative, education, health and the quality of infrastructure outcomes, and three other 
indicators that reflect the so-called “Musgravian” tasks of the government (i.e. distribution, stabilization 
and economic performance).  
3 A large branch of literature emphasizes the importance of exogenous socio-economic factors on the 
translation of government activities into services of interest to citizens (see e.g. Duncombe et al., 1997; 
Bradford et al., 1969). In the same spirit, Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000, pp.76) note that “Governments 
cannot be assumed to be responsible for all the differences in the countries’ performance as represented by 
these indicators. In fact, differences between countries and changes over time often have a lot to do with 
technical progress or cultural differences between countries”. 
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effect of the so-called environmental and noise factors (Fried et al., 2002; Glass et al., 
2006; Simar and Wilson, 2007; Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007). 
Therefore, a first central element of this paper is that it accounts for this problem. In 
terms of a three-stage analysis (similar to that of Fried et al., 2002) we construct public 
spending efficiency (PSE hereafter) indexes that do not misleadingly count institutional 
superiority or luck as governmental efficiency. As our measure is able to distinguish 
between these effects, we argue (in contrast to Duncombe et al., 1997; Bradford, et. al., 
1969) that exogenous socioeconomic factors generally have less of an influence 
(compared to sound policies) on the efficient translation of government spending into 
services of interest to citizens. 
Moreover, based on the “Classification of expenditure according to purpose” (i.e. the 
functional classification of public spending), we decompose total public spending into its 
sub-components, and we estimate relative efficiency scores for each separate public 
spending account. In this way, we obtain relative efficiency indicators for public 
spending on (i) education, (ii) health, (iii) social security and welfare, (iv) general public 
services and (v) economic affairs.4 The decomposition of public spending allows us to 
derive allocative efficiency scores of public spending; that is we examine the 
governments’ ability to distribute their accounts optimally in order to achieve specific 
targets (e.g. better economic performance or economic stability). Using nonparametric 
techniques once again, and employing spending on the five public accounts as inputs, we 
proxy the optimal inputs (as a share of GDP) for each country and for each separate 
spending category.  
The structure of the rest of the paper emerges along the following lines: Section 2 
presents the methodology employed. In Section 3 we describe the data used in our 
empirical analysis. In Section 4 we present the empirical results and finally Section 6 
concludes. 
 
                                                 
4 Decomposing public spending is essential since OECD economies differ in the composition of their 
government expenditures, and thus we may lose valuable information by solely examining the efficiency of 
the overall public spending. For example, it has been pointed out (see e.g. Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000) 
that the main difference between big-government and small-government OECD countries lies in the 
spending for social security and welfare. In the 1990s, social security related expenditure in big-
government countries was two and one-half times higher than in small-government countries (that is an 
average of 0.20 as a share of GDP versus 0.08 as a share of GDP). 
 3
2. Methodology 
Our focus in this article is on frontier efficiency (also called x-efficiency), in other words 
in the distance (in terms of production) of a decision making unit (DMU) from the best-
practice equivalent. This is given by a scalar measure ranging between zero (the lowest 
efficiency measure) and one (corresponding to the optimum DMU). Farrell (1957) 
suggested that the efficiency of a DMU consists of two components: technical efficiency 
(TE), which reflects the ability of a DMU to maximize output given a set of inputs, and 
allocative efficiency (AE), which reflects the ability of a DMU to use the given set of 
inputs in optimal proportions, assuming input prices and technology are known. 
Subsequently, the product of technical and allocative efficiency provides a measure of 
overall economic efficiency (EE). The literature on the measurement of efficiency is 
divided into two major approaches that use either parametric or nonparametric frontiers. 
For our purpose we refer to the various techniques used to measure efficiency by 
indicating only the main lines of methodology. 
In the parametric frontier analysis the technology of a DMU is specified by a 
particular functional form for the cost, profit or production relationship that links the 
DMU’s output to input factors, and as the term “parametric” implies it includes a 
stochastic term. The literature includes various parametric frontier approaches that differ 
in the assumptions made on the stochastic error term, the most widely used being the 
stochastic frontier approach (SFA).5
Among the nonparametric approaches to efficiency measurement the most commonly 
employed is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA is a programming technique that 
provides a linear piecewise frontier by enveloping the observed data points, yielding a 
convex production possibilities set. As such, it does not require the explicit specification 
of a functional form of the underlying production relationship.6 Even though they 
account for the main problem of the stochastic frontier methods, namely the arbitrary 
imposition of a specific functional form, the nonparametric methods have some pitfalls of 
                                                 
5 Other approaches include the distribution-free approach and the thick-frontier approach. For more 
technical definitions of these concepts see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
6 The Free Disposal Hull (FDH) is a special case of DEA, where instead of convexity free disposability of 
inputs and outputs is assumed. Because the FDH frontier is either congruent with or interior to the DEA 
frontier, FDH will typically generate larger estimates of average efficiency compared to DEA (Tulkens, 
1993). Both approaches permit efficiency to vary over time and make no prior assumptions regarding the 
form of the distribution of inefficiencies (except that the best-practice firms are 100% efficient). 
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their own. Most notably they do not permit for random error and, as such, noise can cause 
severe problems in misleadingly shaping and positioning the frontier. Furthermore, tests 
of hypotheses regarding the existence of inefficiency and also regarding the structure of 
the production technology cannot be performed with DEA.7  
In the nonprofit sector, like the public sector, where prices of inputs and – most 
importantly – outputs are difficult to define, PSE measurement is reasonable over longer 
time periods relative to micro-level applications. Hence, the researcher is likely to be 
faced with comparatively small samples, in which DEA’s relative performance vis-à-vis 
stochastic methods may improve (Resti, 2000). Yet, if noise is created from 
computational inaccuracies of the accounting rules used by the international 
organizations (that provide the relevant data), then DEA will generally overestimate 
efficiency. At the same time, simple DEA techniques are unable to account for the effect 
of the macroeconomic or institutional environment on PSE. Furthermore, in the one 
input-one output case,8 stochastic frontiers are not so computationally expensive in terms 
of degrees of freedom. Certainly, the parametric methods still require the specification of 
a functional form for the frontier of each country under consideration, as well as 
distributional assumptions regarding the error term and the residual inefficiency 
component. Since neither approach strictly predominates over the other, we consider an 
advanced procedure that (i) accounts for the effect of environmental variables on the 
estimated efficiency scores and (ii) incorporates statistical noise into DEA.  
This leads to a three-stage DEA model, which may be described as follows:9 In the 
first stage we apply simple input-oriented, variable returns to scale (VRS) DEA10 to 
                                                 
7 For a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of each methodology see Coelli et al. (2005). 
8 This is the case a researcher is probably to be faced with when examining the efficiency of various 
segments of the public sector (i.e. educational system, health system etc.). Given the single input, 
estimation of allocative efficiency is not possible. 
9 This model is a variant of the one developed by Fried et al. (2002), also used by Glass et al. (2006), to 
produced a “technically-level playing field” among DMUs operating in different macroeconomic 
environments and subject to different levels of exposition to luck.  
10 DEA may be computed either as input or output oriented. Input-oriented DEA shows by how much input 
quantities can be reduced without varying the output quantities produced. Output-oriented DEA assesses by 
how much output quantities can be proportionally increased without changing the input quantities used. 
The two measures provide the same results under constant returns to scale but give slightly different values 
under VRS. Nevertheless, both output and input oriented models will identify the same set of 
efficient/inefficient DMUs (see Coelli et al., 2005). Also, a constant returns to scale assumption is only 
appropriate when all DMUs are operating in an optimal scale (imperfections, asymmetries, etc. are not 
present). 
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obtain an initial evaluation of DMU – in our case government – performance. In the 
second stage we use the SFA to separate Stage 1 inefficiency into inefficiency 
attributable to government managerial practices and inefficiency that is due to the 
macroeconomic environment and statistical noise. Finally, in the third stage the original 
dataset of inputs is adjusted to account for the effects uncovered in the second stage, and 
DEA is used to re-evaluate government performance under a new “technically-level 
playing field”. In the rest of the present section we describe each of the three stages in 
more detail. 
 
2.1. Stage 1 
To introduce some notation, let us assume that for N observations there exist M inputs 
producing S outputs. Hence, each observation n uses a nonnegative vector of inputs 
denoted 1 2( , ,..., )
n n n n
m
Mx x x x R+= ∈
S∈
 to produce a nonnegative vector of outputs, denoted 
. Production technology, , 
describes the set of feasible input-output vectors, and the input sets of production 
technology, 
1 2( , ,..., )
n n n n
Sy y y y R+= {( , ) :  can produce y}F y x x=
( ) { : ( , ) }L y x y x F= ∈  describe the sets of input vectors that are feasible for 
each output vector (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).  
To measure productive efficiency we use the following input-oriented DEA model, 
where the inputs are minimized and the outputs are held at their current levels: 
*
0
1
0
1
1
min ,  s.t.
   1, 2,..., ;
     1, 2,..., ;                                                                                            (1)
1
0                
n
j ji i
j
n
j rj r
j
n
j
j
j
x x i m
y y r s
j
θ θ
λ θ
λ
λ
λ
=
=
=
=
≤ =
≥ =
=
≥ =
∑
∑
∑
1,2,..., ;n
 
where DMU0 represents one of the N DMUs under evaluation, and xi0 and yr0 are the ith 
input and rth output for DMU0, respectively. If θ* = 1, then the current input levels cannot 
be proportionally reduced, indicating that DMU0 is on the frontier. Otherwise, if θ* < 1, 
then DMU0 represents an inefficient public sector and θ* represents its input-oriented 
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efficiency score. Finally, λ is the activity vector denoting the intensity levels at which the 
S observations are conducted. Note that this approach, through the convexity constraint 
1 1λ =?  (which accounts for VRS) forms a convex hull of intersecting planes, since the 
frontier production plane is defined by combining some actual production planes.  
In measuring PSE, both desirable and undesirable outputs may be present. For 
example, infant mortality, serving as an output of a country’s health system is an 
undesirable output that a country would want to reduce. Therefore, if we treat infant 
mortality as a conventional output, then we also assume that it should be increasing with 
performance, which is of course invalid. In such cases, we opt for transforming Program 
(1) as follows. First, we multiply each undesirable output by “-1” and then we find a 
proper value vr (in our case we use 100) to let all negative undesirable outputs be positive 
(Zhu, 2003). 
As discussed above, even though the single procedure of Program (1) is widely 
employed to measure efficiency in the empirical literature, it integrates the effect of 
environmental variables and luck, thus it gives an unfair initial advantage to those public 
sectors that face e.g. favorable regulatory and macroeconomic environments or are just 
lucky (a factor captured in parametric methods by the stochastic error term). Giving this 
unfair initial advantage is avoided by carrying out the two subsequent stages of the 
empirical methodology. 
 
2.2. Stage 2   
In this stage we use the SFA to decompose Stage 1 efficiency scores into their 
environmental, inefficiency and statistical noise components. To perform this task we 
apply the methodology of Fried et al. (2002) with slight modifications. The focus here is 
on efficiency estimates, not total input or output slacks, as the majority of these slacks 
tend to be zero after Stage 1 estimation. The virtue of using SFA, as opposed to a limited 
dependent variable approach, is that its error term is asymmetric, with the error term that 
corresponds to inefficiency following either a fixed or a random effects model. 
Furthermore, we stack the N separate equations and estimate a single SFA regression 
model, one for each country (instead of estimating N separate regressions as in Fried et 
al., 2002). The advantage of this approach, besides its relative simplicity, is that it 
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provides for greater degrees of freedom and thus greater statistical efficiency, given that 
our sub-sector datasets at each point in time are small.11  
To further improve on statistical efficiency we choose to stack observations from 
different time periods and estimate a single equation panel data time-varying model (see 
Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). A panel (repeated observations on each DMU) enables 
some of the strong distributional assumptions used with cross-sectional data to be 
relaxed. In particular, as Simar and Wilson (2007) note, DEA efficiency estimates are 
serially correlated. This implies that the error components under an SFA regression are 
not iid, since the efficiency scores are derived from the first stage model. A solution to 
this problem arises if we allow the inefficiency error terms to be correlated amongst 
themselves and across inputs.12 The only assumption needed here is that the remainder 
disturbance is iid and uncorrelated with the regressors. This leads to the estimation of a 
fixed effects model. In the present context, such a model has the additional virtue (which 
is a flaw when one is interested merely in efficiency estimation) that the fixed effects, 
which coincide with inefficiency estimates, capture the effects of all phenomena (such as 
the institutional environment and other macroeconomic factors; see Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). This allows for a direct leveling of the playing field for all DMUs; that is 
we need not use a large total (and thus and ad hoc mixture) of environmental variables to 
test out what really explains inefficiency in the second stage regressions. In fact, this 
suggests that we may not need data on any environmental variables. We just need some 
control variables to obtain fixed effects that are to be used in the third stage. 
Consequently, we may also avoid the potential disagreement on which environmental 
variables actually affect the PSE of each sub-sector (health, education etc.), in which 
direction and in what magnitude.  
                                                 
11 Note that Program 1 is used repeatedly at each point in time. If a multiple period DEA model was 
specified, it would identify efficient DMUs subject e.g. to different technology conditions, and since 
technology (among other things) changes rapidly the results would be biased. 
12 Simar and Wilson (2007) propose a double bootstrap procedure, which is computationally more difficult 
and - more importantly - is better suited for models that seek to examine the relationship between technical 
efficiency and environmental variables. With similar intentions, Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) suggest 
examining the effect of environmental variables on local government performance using nonparametric 
bivariate kernel regressions in the second stage. Examination of the effect of exogenous determinants on 
PSE is somewhat beyond the scope of the present study (as we focus on providing efficiency scores when 
the playing field is leveled for all governments). 
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Given the above, the Stage 2 model with time-varying efficiency is of the following 
linear form:13
( ; )
( )
it i it it
it i
Eff f z v u
u t u
β
β
= +
=
+
uˆ
it
                          (2) 
where zi are control country-specific variables with a time dimension only, β are 
parameter vectors to be estimated, vit represents random statistical noise,  uit represents 
technical inefficiency, and the function β(t) is specified as a set of time dummy variables 
βt. This model, based on Lee and Schmidt (1993), is more appropriate for short panels 
than the Cornwell et al. (1990) model, which is generally used to estimate a time-varying 
fixed effects frontier, since it just requires estimation of T-1 additional parameters. The 
βts are treated as the coefficients of the fixed effects uit, and once both are estimated, uit is 
obtained as , from which  can be calculated. As 
discussed above, we assume that v
ˆ ˆˆmax{ } ( )it t i t iiu uβ β= − ˆexp{ }it itTE u= −
it ~N(0,σ2), but no distributional assumption is made on 
uit, which is allowed to be correlated with the control variables or with the remainder 
disturbance.   
The SFA regression models are interpreted very similar to the analysis of Fried et al. 
(2002). The impact of both the environment and noise on Stage 1 efficiency scores is 
captured by the deterministic feasible frontier ( ; )if z vβ + . Since , the single 
stochastic feasible frontier represents the efficiency level that can be achieved in any 
noisy environment characterized by the control variables, technical inefficiency and 
estimated parameters. Any inefficiency in excess of the stochastic feasible frontier is 
attributable to government managerial inefficiency, because the effects of both the 
environment and statistical noise have been netted out, having been captured by the fixed 
effects. 
0itu ≥
The results derived from the above analysis are then used to penalize public sectors 
that have been advantaged by their relatively favorable economic environment and/or 
their relatively good luck. Thus, this involves the objective of leveling the playing field 
for all governments before repeating the exercise of Stage 1. To do so we adjust upwards 
the inputs used by governments relative to the least favorable environment and most 
                                                 
13 Here we replicate the discussion in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, pp. 108-110), which is based on Lee 
and Schmidt (1993).  
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unlucky government, given by the highest inefficiency score uit. Thus, governments’ 
adjusted inputs are constructed from the results of Stage 2 SFA regressions by means of 
ˆ ˆ[max { } ]Ait it it it itx x v= + − v                (3) 
where Aitx  and itx  are adjusted and observed inputs, respectively. As outlined in Fried et 
al. (2002), the conditional estimators for managerial inefficiency, given by 
, enable estimators for statistical noise to be derived residually via ˆ[ |it it itE u v u+ ]
]
                                                
ˆˆ ˆ[ | ] [ |it it it it i it it itE v v u Eff z E u v uβ+ = − − +              (4) 
which provide conditional on  estimators for the vit itv u+ it in Eq. (3).14
  
2.3. Stage 3 
In Stage 3 we repeat the exercise of Stage 1, this time using the adjusted input data that 
resulted from the analysis of Stage 2. Thus, through this procedure we are able to obtain 
inefficiency scores solely attributable to government managerial practices, which may be 
directly compared between countries.  
 
2.4. Allocation and targeting 
Besides the efficiency concepts highlighted above there may be additional institutional 
and political decisions that restrict the goals of the government towards improved PSE. 
For example, it is important to recognize the distinction between allocating the budget to 
the wrong activities (i.e. producing the wrong output) while being technically efficient. 
To this end, government decisions regarding inputs (i.e. the expenditure on the various 
sub-components of the public sector) are made not on how much to spend for, but also on 
what to spend for. To phrase this differently, budget allocation becomes an extremely 
important decision that if not done optimally it may lead to additional inefficiency, 
termed allocative inefficiency. Stricto sensu, AE reflects the DMUs ability to use the 
inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices. As such, and since the 
 
14 To obtain estimates for vit, we follow the procedure given by Fried et al. (2002), with the modifications 
discussed above and repeated here for convenience. Their model is altered to use the efficiency Stage 1 
scores instead of the slacks, as well as to use a fixed effects model, under which the fixed effects estimates 
incorporate the effect of the environment (instead of carrying out the double adjustment of initial inputs to 
capture the separate effect of the environment and luck under a random effects model, as is the one 
employed by Fried et al., 2002, and Glass et al., 2006). 
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product of TE and AE provides a measure of overall EE, it is obvious that the AE 
component cannot be ignored. 
Even though estimation of AE requires data on input prices, when governments are 
viewed as DMUs the inputs employed are spending accounts as a share of GDP, and 
therefore prices are uniformly set equal to one.15 This suggests that for general PSE 
indicators (to be extensively described below) governments may employ the separate 
public spending accounts as inputs. The Program (1) can be modified to obtain cost 
efficiency (CE) scores, which include both TE and AE. If we let  denote the ith input 
price for DMU
0
ip
0 and 0ix? represent the ith input that minimizes the cost, then 0ix  represents 
the observed cost and CE is given by . Because the actual cost is a 
constant for a specific DMU, CE can be directly calculated from the following DEA 
program: 
0
0
1 1
( ) /(
m m
i i i i
i i
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Based on the estimates derived from the above model, AE is calculated residually by 
AE=CE/TE. This procedure has the additional virtue that optimal inputs (the optimal 
budget proportion allocated to each public spending account) may be derived at some 
chosen weight (price) imposed by the government.16 Let us now comment on how the 
 
15 In the micro literature prices are an important factor affecting optimal allocation because the inputs 
employed are heterogeneous factors of production, and thus they are differently priced. In our case no such 
heterogeneity exists, since our inputs are always public spending accounts. Differently phrased, we have 
equally priced factors of production characterized by different productivity compared to a target. In a 
similar spirit, Zhu (2003) suggests that if different targets along the frontier are considered optimal for 
different DMUs, then construction of preference structures over the proportions by which input levels can 
be changed is appropriate. In other words, DMU-specified input weights serve as input prices, if inputs are 
given by the budget proportions allocated to the various segments of the sector. 
16 Note that Program (5) is run on the inputs derived from the three-stage procedure described above. 
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inputs and outputs discussed so far at a methodological level may be observed 
empirically.   
 
3. Data  
To measure PSE we employ as inputs five public spending accounts. More precisely, 
based on the functional classification of government spending, we use as inputs the 
public spending on (i) education (denoted as EducSp), (ii) health (HealthSp), (iii) 
economic affairs (EcaffSp), (iv) general public services (GPSSp), and (v) social security 
and welfare (WelfSp), all of them as a share of GDP.17  
Data for EducSp are obtained from the World Bank’s “World Development 
Indicators” (WDI). EducSp includes government expenditures on education provided 
either on individual or on a collective basis. Data for HealthSp and WelfSp are taken from 
the OECD’s “Health Statistics Database” (2006) and the OECD’s “Social Spending 
Database” (2000), respectively, whereas data for GPSSp and EcaffSp are obtained from 
IMF’s “Government Financial Statistics” (GFS).  
The respective outputs of the public spending accounts given above are described as 
“performance measures” in the relevant literature (e.g. Afonso et al., 2005; Angelopoulos 
and Philippopoulos, 2005). Following the rationale of this literature we employ as output 
of EducSp the secondary school enrollment (as a share of gross enrollment) taken from 
the WDI. Moreover, in order to capture any qualitative differences among the educational 
systems, we additionally employ as output the quality indicator constructed by Hanushek 
and Kimko (2000). The infant mortality rate and life expectancy at birth (both obtained 
from the WDI) are employed as outputs of HealthSp, whereas income inequality captured 
by the GINI coefficient is assumed to be the output of WelfSp. 
Based on the “Classification of expenditure according to purpose” the Economic 
Affairs spending account (EcaffSp) includes as major sub-components (i) the “spending 
on construction and operation of electricity supply systems”, and (ii) the “spending on 
construction, improvement, operation and maintenance of communication systems”. 
                                                 
17 These correspond to the five out of six largest public spending categories. The only financially important 
spending category that we have not included in this study is public spending on defence. This is because it 
was fairly difficult to substantiate the output of this spending category. See below for more details on this. 
Also, for more details on the classification of the functions of government see Classification of Expenditure 
According to purpose (United Nations, 2000).   
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Thus, as outputs of EcaffSp we use quality measures of the electricity and 
telecommunications infrastructure, namely the electric power transmission and 
distribution losses (taken from the WDI), and the standard telephone access lines per 100 
inhabitants (taken from the OECD’s Telecommunication Database). Finally, we employ 
as outputs of GPSSp (i) the corruption in government, and (ii) the bureaucratic quality 
measures, both obtained from the IRIS-3 database.18
In order to examine the AE of public spending, we need more general indicators that 
could be interpreted as the output of the overall public spending, and must reflect the 
objectives (or alternatively the tasks) of government.19 Again following the rationale of 
the relevant literature we utilize two well-established indicators that reflect the 
“Musgravian” tasks of government. These are (i) the general economic performance 
indicator (EcPerf) and (ii) the economic stability indicator (EcStab). If we consider these 
indicators as government targets, we may well estimate AE using the five spending 
accounts as inputs and the methodology described in Section 2.4. That is we may 
evaluate how different allocation of public spending among the separate accounts 
produces different outcomes, and subsequently what is the optimal allocation of public 
spending. 
The outputs of EcPerf are assumed to be the unemployment rate, GDP per capita and 
the annual GDP growth rate. Lower scores in the unemployment rate and higher scores in 
GDP per capita and GDP growth reflect better economic performance. Data for these 
variables are obtained from the WDI. Finally, the outputs of EcStab are assumed to be the 
standard deviation of the GDP growth rate, which is interpreted as a measure of 
economic fluctuations, and the inflation rate. Lower scores in both measures denote 
improved economic stability. 
Apart from the variables described so far, in the second stage of the estimation 
procedure we additionally use a set of control variables (specific to each sub-component 
                                                 
18 The “corruption in government” and “bureaucratic quality” variables are used by Angelopoulos and 
Philippopoulos (2005) and Afonso et al. (2005) as proxies of public administration performance. Since 
GPSSp is a public expenditure account mainly financing public administration, we employ these measures 
as outputs of the GPSSp. 
19 As Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000, pp. 75) state: “It is difficult or even impossible to consider all the social 
and economic objectives (and thus all the socioeconomic indicators) that the governments might want to 
influence with this spending. By necessity, the analysis will include fewer indicators than might have been 
desirable to include”. 
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of public spending), to carry out the SFA regressions. These are the GDP per capita, the 
urbanization rate, the population density, the proportion of population above 65 years of 
age and the international market openness, all obtained from the WDI. Moreover, we use 
the government stability measure, the investment profile variable and the general proxy 
of the socioeconomic conditions, obtained from the IRIS-3 database. Finally, we use the 
Quinn (1997) indicator of capital market international integration.20
Table 1 reports the inputs and outputs used, along with some descriptive statistics. 
Even though the sample of countries considered is rather homogeneous consisting of top 
income countries, the size and the pattern of government spending in these countries are 
quite different. Thus, there are countries characterized by relatively large public sectors, 
whose government spending exceeds 40 percent as a share of GDP (e.g. the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Denmark), and countries with a public sector size that does not exceed 25 
percent as a share of GDP (e.g. Austria, Switzerland and USA). Moreover, as regards the 
composition of government expenditures, there are countries that present a clear-cut 
priority towards social security and welfare spending (e.g. the Nordic countries), and 
others characterized by heavy spending on public infrastructure (such as Ireland, Norway 
and Finland, whose public spending on economic affairs exceeds 5 percent as a share of 
GDP). These differences may have appealing implications for the results of the empirical 
analysis that follows. 
 
4. Estimation results 
Space constraints prevent reporting the results of all three stages of analysis, as this 
would triple the number of tables. Thus, only limited information is provided for the 
Stage 1 and Stage 2 results in the text to allow comparison with the Stage 3 results. The 
                                                 
20 More precisely, the efficiency scores of general public services obtained from Stage 1 are regressed on 
government stability, GDP per capita and the urbanization rate; the efficiency scores of education spending 
on GDP per capita, the IRIS socioeconomic condition indicator and the population density; the efficiency 
score of public health on GDP per capita, population density and the proportion of population above 65 
years old; the efficiency scores of economic affairs on IRIS-3 investment profile, the socioeconomic 
conditions indicator and on the capital market international integration proxy constructed by Quinn (1997); 
the efficiency scores of social spending on government stability, the socioeconomic conditions and the 
urbanization rate; and finally in the cases of the efficiency scores of economic performance and stability we 
employ government stability, the socioeconomic conditions and international market integration as control 
variables. In any case we avoid using in the Stage 2 analysis any of the variables employed as outputs in the 
production process.  
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full set of Stage 3 relative PSE scores is reported in Tables 2a and 2b for the 1980s and 
the 1990s, correspondingly.21 The results are reported for each of the 19 countries of our 
sample and for each separate account of public spending, while in the last two columns of 
Table 2 we present the relative efficiency scores of total spending when the government 
target is economic performance and economic stability, correspondingly. Sensitivity 
analysis performed on the Stage 3 results showed that efficient public sectors remained 
efficient to any simultaneous data changes in the respective inputs (for a detailed 
discussion of the sensitivity analysis on DEA estimates see Zhu, 2003).  
Let us first turn to the discussion of the ranking of countries as derived from the Stage 
3 results. Concerning the PSE of education, the frontier is shaped by a number of 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Greece, Norway and USA) in the 1980s, and the 
general ranking remains practically the same in the 1990s. Switzerland, UK and Spain 
attain relatively high efficiency scores, while Luxembourg and Germany are the last 
countries in the ranking. Since the educational systems of the OECD countries examined 
are far from being homogeneous in the sources of spending (private or public), it is 
important to account for the different ratios of private to public spending on education.22 
As such, we weight the outputs of Educsp (i.e. the secondary school enrollment and the 
quality of education) with the public to total spending ratio. By doing so we isolate the 
impact of private expenditure on output, and consequently we don’t give countries 
characterized by heavy private funding on education an unfair advantage.  
The frontier of the efficiency of public spending on health is shaped by Luxembourg, 
Portugal and Sweden in the 1980s, and Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden in the 
1990s. Switzerland, Australia and Spain are ranked among the good performers, whereas 
France, Germany and Sweden are last in the countries’ ranking. As with the case of 
education, we account for the differences in the ratios of private to public spending on 
                                                 
21 The full set of Stage 1 and Stage 2 results is available upon request. The estimations were also carried out 
for 5-year time periods, the results being similar. Since the outputs used to estimate efficiency do not vary 
substantially over time we preferred to report the 10-year period results. The 5-year period results are also 
available upon request. 
22 In our sample there are countries characterized by heavy private funding on education (such as Australia 
or USA) and countries that base the financing of their educational systems on public funds (such as Finland 
and Denmark). 
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health by weighting the outputs of HealthSp with the ratio of public to total spending on 
health.23   
Turning to the spending on economic affairs we note that even though a number of 
countries shape the frontier both in the 1980s and in the 1990s, the average efficiency 
score is only larger than the average efficiency score for general public services. It is not 
surprising that countries belonging to the efficient group (e.g. Finland, Germany, Sweden 
and Switzerland) are characterized by citizen-friendly regulatory environments and have 
been pioneers in ensuring their regulations are clear, cost-effective and directly linked to 
their policy goals. In contrast and with reference to the bad performers, apart from 
Luxembourg that represents a unique case (as it almost never implemented a cost-benefit 
analysis in its public sector), Norway was characterized by a relatively inflexible wage 
setting in the public sector, and Portugal suffered from weak human resource 
management and labor market inflexibility (see OECD, various issues).   
As regards the efficiency scores of general public services, the frontier in the 1980s is 
shaped by Switzerland, with Germany, USA and Spain presenting sound performance. In 
contrast, Luxembourg and Greece appear to be the most inefficient countries. In the 
1990s Canada accompanies Switzerland in shaping the frontier, with the general ranking 
changing only in few cases. Note that since most of the OECD countries examined 
present satisfactory scores in the outputs of this public sector category, differences in the 
efficiency scores are mainly driven by differences in spending. Thus, Luxembourg is the 
last country in the general ranking not because it is characterized by high corruption in 
government or unsatisfactory bureaucratic quality, but because it spends relatively more 
in order to achieve these goals.  
Social security and welfare is the largest public spending account. According to Tanzi 
and Schuknecht (1998) this spending account increased the most in the last 35 years, 
from an average of less than 10 percent of GDP in 1960 to 23 percent of GDP in 1995, 
which corresponds to about three quarters of the total public expenditure increase since 
1960. Thus, if one wants to examine the evolution of total spending and to explain its 
increasing trend during the last four decades it is crucial to focus on this account. In this 
                                                 
23 The ratio of public to total spending on health is only 41.6% in USA and 51.9 % in Greece, while it 
reaches 88.42% and 87.32% in Sweden and Norway, correspondingly. 
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spending category the frontier is shaped by Australia and Finland in the 1980s, and 
Australia, Belgium, Denmark and USA in the 1990s. Moreover, the countries’ ranking 
does not seem to change substantially through time.24 Australia, Canada, Finland, 
Norway and USA present relatively high efficiency scores in both periods, whereas the 
scores of France, Ireland and the Netherlands reflect poor performance. Moreover, the 
results imply that PSE on social security can be achieved through either large or small 
social security spending accounts. In particular, there are countries characterized by small 
social security spending accounts that appear to be highly efficient (e.g. USA and 
Australia), and countries with large social security spending accounts that also present 
high efficiency scores (e.g. Finland and Norway). Quite a reverse case is presented by the 
Netherlands and Ireland, both indicating poor performance, although the former spends 
substantially on welfare policies and the latter much less.25  
 The second to last columns of Tables 2a and 2b report the relative efficiency scores of 
total spending when the government target is economic performance. Under this 
government target the frontier is shaped by Australia, Switzerland, Luxembourg and 
USA in the 1980s, and Switzerland, Ireland, Portugal and USA in the 1990s. Although 
the ranking of countries appears to change through time, we note that Australia, Canada, 
and Spain represent relatively efficient countries, whereas France, Denmark, Sweden and 
the Netherlands are characterized by poor performance. Yet, these results should be 
interpreted with caution since the countries examined present small differences in GDP 
per capita, as well as in their GDP growth and unemployment rates (assumed to be the 
outputs). As such, countries with relatively large public sectors may have a disadvantage 
under this specification of outputs.  
The last column reports the relative efficiency scores of total spending when the 
government target is economic stability. In this case Australia, Switzerland, France, the 
Netherlands, Spain and USA in the 1980s, and Australia, Belgium, France, the 
                                                 
24 The only exception worth noting is Denmark, which appears to be one of the worst performers in the 
1980s and one of the best in the 1990s. 
25 One very important issue related with the efficiency of spending on social security and welfare is the 
design and the targeting of transfers. According to Tanzi and Schuknecht (1998), in France or Sweden 
more than 20 percent of transfers are redistributed to the richest 20 percent of households. Such a targeting 
generates a situation that has been described by Palda (1997) as “fiscal churning”. The targeting of 
transfers, and consequently the ability of a system to redistribute towards the deprived, are key 
determinants of the efficiency of spending on social security and welfare.  
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Netherlands and USA in the 1990s shape the frontier. Although the countries ranking 
appear to change substantially through time, note that Canada, Switzerland and Germany 
perform well, whereas Norway and Sweden present low efficiency scores. Again these 
results should be interpreted with caution since most OECD economies are characterized 
by low inflation and stable growth rates during the period examined. Thus, countries with 
relatively large public sectors may present worse efficiency scores, if they achieve similar 
economic targets by “paying” relatively more.26  
Comparing the Stage 1 with the Stage 3 results we note that levelling the playing field 
between OECD countries does not affect significantly the country ranking. The Spearman 
correlation of the rankings formed by the first and the third stage efficiency scores in both 
the 1980s and the 1990s (see last rows of Tables 2a and 2b) is quite high, and never 
becomes significant at the 5 per cent level.27 This result has clear implications regarding 
the forces that shape PSE, since luck and superior institutional environment appear to be 
less important than sound governance. In turn, this reflects the idea that governments 
have much to gain by observing and implementing the strategies followed by the efficient 
governments, in an attempt to improve their own PSE levels.   
Tables 3a and 3b report the optimal allocation of inputs when governments set as 
specific targets economic performance and economic stability, correspondingly. Given 
the relative homogeneity of the group of countries examined, we should not expect great 
differences between the optimal levels of inputs across countries, within the same public 
spending accounts. This is indeed the case. For example, optimal public spending on 
education ranges between 5.3% for Sweden and 6.2% for Luxembourg as a share of GDP 
(if the government target is economic performance). The same is true for the rest of the 
public spending accounts, with the notable exception of public spending on social 
security and welfare, where the variability of optimal inputs between countries is larger. 
                                                 
26 However, we should note that our results do not suggest any relationship between government size and 
greater economic stability (through the function of automatic stabilizers etc). In our set of efficient 
countries there are some characterized by high public spending (such as the Netherlands, France and 
Germany), and others characterized by small public sectors (e.g. USA and Switzerland). Moreover, some 
countries are characterized by large public sectors, while they present poor efficiency scores (e.g. Norway 
and Sweden). 
27 A point worth noting is that the Spearman correlation of the ranking of countries produced by our Stage 1 
results (when the target is economic performance) with the public sector performance indicator ranking 
reported in  Afonso et al. (2005) is 0.846. 
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Also, the results when economic stability represents the goal of the government are 
quantitatively similar. Certainly, these optimal inputs may better be viewed as 
approximations of the true optimal inputs, with the averages presented in the last rows of 
Tables 3a and 3b being representative of these approximations. At a broader level of 
analysis and in light of the OECD policy recommendations (see OECD policy briefs, 
various issues), we contend that the optimal inputs derived seem to be quite reasonable.     
 
6. Conclusions 
Recent developments in data envelopment analysis allow the disentangling of efficiency 
scores that are due to managerial practices form those that are due to the macroeconomic 
environment or luck. In such a fashion we obtained relative PSE scores for five major 
public spending accounts across 19 developed OECD countries. The evidence we 
presented adds credence to the proposition that individual countries have much to gain by 
looking at the relative efficiency in the provision of public services of other countries. 
Yet, the exploration of the forces that shape PSE showed that individual country 
characteristics and the effect of mere luck are less important than governance in 
determining PSE. By additionally looking at general performance indicators we also 
proposed a method to estimate the optimal allocation of public funds among the different 
accounts. The results provide a rigorous consensus that a best practice is quantifiable and 
that the optimal allocation of funds, perhaps with the exception of spending on social 
security and welfare, should be fairly uniform between the 19 OECD countries examined.   
These results point to a new agenda for research on how government efficiency affects 
economic performance. This agenda may simply examine the interrelationship between 
the efficiency of public spending, growth and economic volatility, but may well have 
other repercussions as well. The implications of the estimated scores for bureaucratic 
efficiency and capacity, the heavily debated link between democratic institutions and the 
public sector and the potential benefits of political reform, are only few key extensions to 
the present analysis. The further progress of such theoretical and empirical studies may 
significantly improve our understanding of the challenges faced in governing the public 
sectors as well as the monitoring of economic development. Yet, before moving on to 
another issue we had better bring this entry to a close. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics for outputs and inputs 
Outputs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Secondary school enrolment  102.46 15.87 72.9 136.5
Quality of education  55.71 5.65 44.5 64.6
Life expectancy at birth  75.94 1.44 73.31 78.56
Infant mortality rate  8.44 2.12 5.00 12.00
Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of 
total electric power output) 
7.25 3.14 3.85 22.5
Standard access lines per 100 inhabitants  45.86 10.56 19.58 67.98
Corruption in government 5.42 0.605 4.25 6.00
Bureaucratic quality 3.89 0.246 3.00 4.00
GINI coefficient 29.33 4.74 21.5 38.97
Unemployment rate 7.30 3.67 0.59 15.15
GDP growth rate (annual %)  2.72 1.16 0.93 7.1
GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$)  25331.79 8036.63 11611 45210
Std. dev. of the annual GDP growth rate 1.65 0.544 0.89 2.98
Inflation rate (consumer prices annual %)  4.45 2.52 1.89 10.25
Inputs  
Public spending on education (% of GDP) 5.60 1.10 3.1 7.8
Public spending on health (% of GDP) 5.83 1.03 4.08 7.94
Public spending on economic affairs (% of GDP) 3.99 1.91 1.45
Public spending on general public services (% of GDP) 2.07 0.83 0.92
Public spending on social security and welfare (% of GDP) 16.95 4.78 7.76
8.00
3.9
26.28
Table 2a  
Stage 3 efficiency scores by public spending account for 19 OECD countries, 1980-1990 
  Education Health 
Economic  
Affairs 
General  
Public 
Services 
Social 
Security  
and Welfare Performance Stability 
 Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Australia 0.579 12 0.779 7 0.933 2 0.409 7 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Austria 0.762 8 0.750 9 0.432 8 0.371 9 0.822 6 0.615 11 0.841 2 
Belgium 0.795 5   0.324 10 0.333 12 0.688 10 0.621 10 0.701 9 
Canada 0.787 6 0.630 14 0.501 7 0.378 8 0.823 5 0.753 6 0.755 6 
Denmark 1.000 1 0.580 16 0.660 4 0.249 15 0.586 14 0.536 14 0.523 13 
Finland 1.000 1 0.761 8 0.356 9 0.346 11 1.000 1 0.784 4 0.825 3 
France 0.644 9 0.687 13 0.724 3 0.285 14 0.421 17 0.612 12 1.000 1 
Germany 0.409 14 0.580 15 1.000 1 0.775 2 0.679 12 0.729 7 1.000 1 
Greece 1.000 1 0.834 4 0.282 11 0.211 18 0.639 13 0.762 5 0.756 5 
Ireland 0.593 11 0.697 12 0.227 15 0.212 17 0.559 16 0.574 13 0.574 11 
Luxembourg 0.348 15 1.000 1 0.227 14 0.196 19 0.708 9 1.000 1 0.546 12 
Norway 1.000 1 0.730 11 0.271 12 0.417 6 0.961 2 0.722 8 0.606 10 
Portugal 0.523 13 1.000 1 0.269 13 0.311 13 0.885 3 0.822 3 0.822 4 
Spain 0.826 4 0.908 2 0.512 6 0.670 4 0.576 15 0.852 2 1.000 1 
Sweden 0.618 10 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.359 10 0.724 8 0.524 15 0.732 8 
Switzerland 0.947 2 0.804 5 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.681 11 1.000 1 1.000 1 
The Netherlands 0.770 7 0.749 10 1.000 1 0.239 16 0.343 18 0.509 16 1.000 1 
United Kingdom 0.835 3 0.872 3 0.562 5 0.510 5 0.735 7 0.721 9 0.749 7 
USA 1.000 1 0.789 6 1.000 1 0.689 3 0.837 4 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Average 0.760  0.786  0.594  0.419  0.719  0.744  0.812  
Spearman correlation  
with Stage 1 results  0.852  0.925  0.942  0.896  0.866  0.913  0.902
 21
Table 2b  
Stage 3 efficiency scores by public spending account for 19 OECD countries, 1990-2000 
  Education Health 
Economic 
 Affairs 
General  
Public 
Services 
Social 
Security and 
Welfare Performance Stability 
  Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Australia 0.843 5 0.865 4 0.836 3 0.390 12 1.000 1 0.942 2 1.000 1 
Austria 0.780 8 0.758 10 0.470 8 0.287 14 0.502 16 0.636 10 0.702 10 
Belgium 1.000 1 0.717 11   1.000 1 1.000 1 0.798 3 1.000 1 
Canada 1.000 1 0.675 14 0.858 2 1.000 1 0.843 5 0.786 4 0.985 2 
Denmark 0.795 7 0.682 13 0.798 4 0.419 9 1.000 1 0.597 12 0.767 7 
Finland 1.000 1 0.771 9 1.000 1 0.683 4 0.867 4 0.515 14 0.656 12 
France 0.651 12 0.664 15 0.619 5 0.239 16 0.504 15 0.571 13 1.000 1 
Germany 0.564 15 0.582 16 1.000 1 0.771 2 0.970 2 0.696 7 0.775 6 
Greece 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.347 9 0.393 10 0.577 11 0.731 6 0.759 8 
Ireland 0.661 11 1.000 1 0.233 11 0.156 17 0.686 10 1.000 1 0.805 4 
Luxembourg 0.695 9 1.000 1 0.221 12 0.251 15 0.839 6 1.000 1 0.757 9 
Norway 1.000 1 0.689 12 0.235 10 0.442 8 0.878 3 0.639 9 0.606 13 
Portugal 0.636 13 0.947 2   0.764 3 0.772 7 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Spain 0.690 10 0.864 5 0.499 7 0.669 5 0.687 9 0.769 5 0.782 5 
Sweden 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.584 6 0.691 8 0.495 15 0.487 14 
Switzerland 0.952 3 0.910 3 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.562 12 1.000 1 0.819 3 
The Netherlands 0.816 6 0.859 6 1.000 1 0.390 11 0.516 13 0.629 11 1.000 1 
United Kingdom 0.941 4 0.853 7 0.511 6 0.492 7 0.514 14 0.656 8 0.664 11 
USA 0.970 2 0.819 8 1.000 1 0.336 13 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Average 0.842  0.824  0.684  0.540  0.758  0.761  0.819  
Spearman correlation  
with stage 1 results  0.925  0.896  0.873  0.913  0.798  0.902  0.902 
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 Table 3a  
Optimal inputs: Performance 
  1980         1990         
  EducSp HealthSp EcaffSp GPSSp WelfSp EducSp HealthSp EcaffSp GPSSp WelfSp
Australia 5.637 4.956 2.283 2.262 7.773 5.355 5.481 1.526 1.554 10.838 
Austria 5.324 4.530 2.600 1.457 9.967 5.333 5.684 1.756 1.768 11.549 
Belgium 5.920 4.365 2.144 1.435 9.138 5.218 5.866 1.552 2.156 9.220 
Canada 5.666 4.897 2.269 2.179 7.910 5.366 5.513 0.842 1.170 10.637 
Denmark 5.661 4.283 2.365 1.199 10.026 5.371 5.667 2.166 1.812 12.873 
Finland 5.749 4.828 4.500 2.879 11.279 5.237 5.820 1.460 2.029 9.402 
France 5.947 4.310 2.131 1.357 9.266 5.224 5.852 1.523 2.116 9.277 
Germany 5.823 4.387 2.219 1.431 9.290 5.261 5.817 1.791 2.090 10.367 
Greece 5.578 4.875 2.343 2.109 8.189 5.532 5.119 0.049 0.068 12.220 
Ireland 5.637 4.956 2.283 2.262 7.773 5.408 4.825 6.880 3.940 14.119 
Luxembourg 6.174 4.770 9.396 4.729 18.095 4.150 5.070 7.244 4.792 17.129 
Norway 5.459 4.552 3.812 1.994 11.505 4.894 5.623 3.377 2.986 11.849 
Portugal 5.637 4.956 2.283 2.262 7.773 5.542 5.095   12.317 
Spain 5.637 4.956 2.283 2.262 7.773 5.461 5.288 0.388 0.539 11.543 
Sweden 5.263 4.446 2.662 1.298 10.400 5.220 5.874 1.649 2.195 9.420 
Switzerland 5.118 4.249 2.808 0.926 11.413 5.639 5.301 3.082 1.133 18.997 
The Netherlands 5.891 4.425 2.158 1.519 9.000 5.230 5.773 1.620 2.026 9.948 
United Kingdom 5.637 4.956 2.283 2.262 7.773 5.375 5.492 0.799 1.110 10.723 
USA 5.951 4.301 2.129 1.345 9.287 5.207 5.892 1.604 2.229 9.116 
Average 5.669 4.631 2.892 1.956 9.665 5.264 5.529 2.184 1.984 11.660 
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Table 3b  
Optimal inputs: Stability  
  1980         1990         
  EducSp HealthSp EcaffSp GPSSp WelfSp EducSp HealthSp EcaffSp GPSSp WelfSp
Australia 5.637 4.956 2.283 2.262 7.773 5.290 5.580 2.021 2.237 11.142 
Austria 5.385 7.108 2.894 1.547 15.708 4.821 6.455 0.625 0.838 16.030 
Belgium 4.703 4.703 3.131 1.068 12.356 4.616 6.766   18.703 
Canada 5.846 4.521 2.181 1.652 8.779 4.717 6.587 0.305 0.338 17.562 
Denmark 5.802 4.612 2.202 1.780 8.567 5.298 6.760 1.678 1.807 20.323 
Finland 4.507 5.817 3.516 1.737 15.205 4.671 6.786 0.108 0.109 18.819 
France 5.921 6.251 3.184 3.244 18.971 6.228 7.341 3.160 3.209 22.098 
Germany 5.333 7.361 2.796 1.195 15.086 4.948 6.182 0.996 1.103 14.976 
Greece 5.637 4.956 2.283 2.262 7.773 5.261 5.762 1.343 1.866 9.636 
Ireland 5.637 4.956 2.283 2.262 7.773 4.928 6.216 0.938 1.038 15.193 
Luxembourg 5.646 4.282 2.378 1.192 10.064 4.795 6.450 0.538 0.596 16.690 
Norway 5.645 4.940 2.279 2.239 7.810 5.055 6.012 1.299 1.492 13.413 
Portugal 5.637 4.956 2.283 2.262 7.773 5.542 5.095   12.317 
Spain 3.280 4.575 4.157 1.382 13.491 5.346 5.561 0.938 1.304 10.444 
Sweden 5.006 5.797 3.470 2.460 16.846 5.240 5.813 1.446 2.010 9.430 
Switzerland 5.118 4.249 2.808 0.926 11.413 4.987 6.113 1.114 1.232 14.537 
The Netherlands 6.819 5.264 5.915 3.873 23.313 5.289 5.614 3.219 3.848 21.143 
United Kingdom 5.413 4.356 2.538 1.352 10.134 5.287 5.701 1.219 1.694 9.883 
USA 5.951 4.301 2.129 1.345 9.287 5.207 5.892 1.604 2.229 9.116 
Average 5.417 5.156 2.879 1.897 12.006 5.133 6.141 1.327 1.585 14.813 
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